An Empirical Examination of Fund Investor Timing Ability

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Via SSRN:

Interesting paper from Geoffrey C. Friesen and Travis Sapp. From the Abstract:

We examine the timing ability of mutual fund investors using cash flow data at the individual fund level. Over 1991-2004 equity fund investor timing decisions reduce fund investor average returns by 1.56% annually. Underperformance due to poor timing is greater in load funds and funds with relatively large risk-adjusted returns. In particular, the magnitude of investor underperformance due to poor timing largely offsets the risk-adjusted alpha gains offered by good-performing funds. Investors in both actively managed funds and index funds exhibit poor investment timing. We demonstrate that our empirical results are consistent with investor return-chasing behavior.

Read the paper here

Replacing Modern Portfolio Theory


Via The Aleph Blog:

I have never liked using MPT [Modern Portfolio Theory] for calculating the cost of equity capital for two reasons:

  • Beta is not a stable parameter; also, it does not measure risk well.
  • Company-specific risk is significant, and varies a great deal.  The effects on a company with a large amount of debt financing is significant.

What did they do in the old days?  They added a few percent on to where the company’s long debt traded, less for financially stable companies, more for those that took significant risks.  If less scientific, it was probably more accurate than MPT.  Science is often ill-applied to what may be an art.  Neoclassical economics is a beautiful shining edifice of mathematical complexity and practical uselessness.

I’ve also never been a fan of the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorems.  They are true in fair weather, but not in foul weather.  The costs of getting in financial stress are high, much less when a firm is teetering on the edge of insolvency.  The cost of financing assets goes up dramatically when a company needs financing in bad times.

Read the full post here

Welcome to the University of iTunes

Monday, October 19, 2009

Via CNN.com:

The wisdom of business professors, once only available to MBAs and business students, can now be accessed by anybody with an Internet connection.

Hundreds of universities, and a growing number of business schools, are making recordings of lectures, seminars and conferences available to the general public via Web sites such as iTunes and YouTube.

Leading business schools including University of Cambridge Judge Business School, Fuqua School of Business, and Yale School of Management make course content available for download through iTunes University (iTunes U), part of the of the iTunes online store.

That means those whose budget won’t stretch to a two-year MBA can simulate the experience at home — or at work, in the gym or anywhere else they choose. And even better for money-conscious learners, the iTunes U content can all be downloaded free of charge.

Begun as an experiment in partnership with Apple, all new MBAs at HEC are provided with an iPod Touch. Around half of the MBA lectures are filmed using an automatic camera system and the footage is made available for students to download and view on their iPhones.

YouTube EDU was launched in March this year and hosts the YouTube channels of hundreds of universities. Earlier this month it added content from 45 universities in Europe and Israel and now holds videos of lectures and discussions provided by business schools including INSEAD, ESCP Europe and University of California Haas School of Business.

Launched at the same time as YouTube EDU, Academic Earth hosts videos from U.S. universities including Harvard, Yale and Princeton, although the business content is provided almost exclusively by Stanford University.

Offering less audio/visual content, but still full of business school information, MIT’s Open Course Ware site gives free access to almost all MIT course content, including extensive lecture notes, assignments and exams from MIT’s Sloan School of Management.

Interested in the “Advanced Topics in Real Estate Finance?” You can download the complete lecture notes from Sloan’s 2007 course on the subject at MIT’s Open Course Ware site.

Other universities have their own Open Course Ware sites and the Open Course Ware Consortium has been set up as an agglomerator site, providing content from more over 200 higher education institutions.

But it’s iTunes U that’s generating the most interest. The University of Oxford says there have been more than one million downloads from its iTunes U site, while Stanford University says its course on creating iPhone applications was downloaded more than one million times in just seven weeks.

This week’s most popular business download on iTunes U is a University of Oxford lecture called “Entrepreneurship and the Ideal Business Plan.”

Successful Market Timing


Via World Beta:

If you have the emotional makeup for it, timing can reduce your risks and enhance your returns. If you’re satisfied that you have what it takes to be a market timer, here are the best tips I know for doing it successfully. They aren’t necessarily listed in order of priority. In fact, I suggest that you regard each one of them as the top priority.

1. Use mechanical strategies.
Timing financial markets is already plenty hard without worrying about making predictions or (even worse) thinking you have to decide who is right when smart economists and savvy analysts make conflicting forecasts and draw different conclusions. If you leave the final decisions to subjective factors, you will never be sure what you are supposed to do at any given moment. That will cause you anxiety and delay. And you’ll have a system you can’t count on. Rely primarily on trend-following systems that are based mainly on trends that are impacted by actual prices in the market. There’s nothing speculative about prices. They reflect what buyers and sellers are doing, and that’s about as reliable an indicator of the direction of the market as you can find.

2. Do not — repeat DO NOT — pay much attention to the effect of every trade.
The majority of individual trades will be irrelevant to your long-term results. If you feel you must focus on each trade and agonize over what it means, that’s a sure sign you are not cut out to be a successful timer. Dwelling on each trade is a sure way to drive yourself nuts, and it won’t improve your results at all.

3. Use timing systems that are right for you and your temperament.
The perfect strategy for you will match your time horizon, will respect your emotional needs and will operate within your tolerance for risk and change. There are short-term systems that trade frequently, long-term systems that trade infrequently and intermediate-term systems that typically trade two to six times a year. Over long periods of time, no group has an inherent return advantage over the others. But the practical and emotional differences are important. If you have a strong desire to perform closely in synch with the market, use short-term systems, which are good at quickly reacting to today’s highly volatile market swings. However, short-term systems demand that you make many trades, and each trade has potential tax consequences unless you are investing in a tax-sheltered account. The volume of trades demands a lot of attention, produces a lot of paperwork and tests the patience of many mutual funds, which sometimes won’t accept accounts from very active timers. If on the other hand you have a strong aversion to whipsaws, you can use long-term systems. But doing so will sometimes make you wait for a move of 20 percent or more before you buy or sell. For the best compromise, do as we do: Use intermediate-term systems. This level of activity is likely to be accepted by most mutual funds and is not too demanding emotionally.

4. Use multiple timing systems, stick with them and let them act independently in your portfolio.
Even the most productive system from the past may be a mediocre performer in the future, and the reverse could also be the case. We use four U.S. equity timing models, each of which governs 25 percent of our portfolio. We have faith in the systems as a group. But we don’t have enough faith in any one system to let it govern the whole portfolio. You shouldn’t either. Just as you should not chase recent performance in your choice of mutual funds or asset classes, do not chase recent high-flying timing systems. One of the smartest timers in this business, a fellow newsletter publisher whose work I respect, has averaged about 9 percent over the past decade. He chooses good timing systems, which have produced average returns of more than 18 percent before he adopts them. But he doesn’t stick with those systems. Whenever the system he has been using disappoints him, he finds another one that would not have done so, based on real or hypothetical past performance, and then he switches to that system. In theory, this may seem like a valid way to search for the very finest system on the planet. But in truth, such “superstar” timing models simply do not exist. They are a myth. Good performance one year doesn’t mean anything about performance the next year – not anything. This is one of the hardest facts for investors to accept, but it’s true. Therefore, we believe your best bet is to find several robust timing models and stick with them.

5. Remember that whether you use a buy-and-hold approach or market timing, asset allocation is the most important investment decision you will make as an investor.
Use many assets or asset classes that move up and down at different times and at different speeds. Include international diversification, whether you invest in equities, bonds or both. Just as you never know which timing model will be the star performer in a given quarter or year, you never know which asset class will be the overachiever and which will be the laggard.

6. Follow your systems and your strategy.
Put them into action without fail and without exception. Remember this Chinese proverb: “He who knows but does not act, still does not know.” If you do only one thing right and everything else wrong, make sure this is the one thing you do right. This is the most essential key of all. If buying diet books and exercise equipment took off pounds, obesity would not be a major health concern. You can devise the greatest portfolio in the history of investing, but it will do you no good unless you commit your money to it. The greatest timing models do you no good unless you apply them. Therefore, do whatever is necessary to get it done.

7. Before you start timing, take off the rose-colored glasses, if you are wearing them.
Focus in advance on the difficulties you can expect as well as the ultimate rewards you hope to achieve. Accepting the rewards of success will be easy. But you’ll never get to the finish line unless you can deal with the hurdles along the track. Know the level of interim losses you are likely to encounter with your strategy, and make sure you are willing to accept them. In the early 1970s, buy-and-hold investors in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index suffered a 39 percent loss in one year. Even timing can be ugly. In our Worldwide Equity strategy, all our back-testing has failed to produce a decline as high as 15 percent in any 12-month period. Yet we believe that any strategy with the potential to produce returns of 13 to 15 percent a year also has the potential to lose 15 percent in a year, so that’s the figure we use when we project the expected worst-case scenario. Bottom line: Do not expect magic from any timing system.

8. Give timing enough time to work. In the short term, anything can happen.

In the long term, if you have chosen a strategy carefully and you follow the discipline, you should be rewarded accordingly. But how long is long enough? There are two places to look for the answer. The first is in your own psychology. Do you normally undertake long-term projects or strategies, comfortable knowing that you’ll have to wait for any payoff? If so, you may be a good candidate for market timing. But if on the other hand you are usually quick to judge the success or failure of something you start, and if you need instant gratification, you’ll probably have trouble being a successful market timer. The second place to look for the answer is in statistics and history. Arm yourself (or have your manager do this for you) with the past statistical performance, either real or hypothetical, of your proposed investment. Over the longest period for which you have data, determine the depth of the largest drawdown. Find out how long it took to return to break-even. One of our most aggressive timing programs, which we call by the shorthand of +2 to -1, meaning it attempts to double the performance of large U.S. stocks when the market is rising and to do the opposite of the market during declines, once took nearly two years to recover from a 20 percent drawdown. Are you prepared to endure that in order to make returns of more than 20 percent? Here’s an even tougher example of the extraordinary patience required of investors: In 1973 and 1974, the S&P 500 declined by 44.9 percent. The index eventually regained its pre-decline level. But it took 66 months for some investors just to break even. Unless you are sure you’d stick with a strategy through the longest historical drawdown for which you have data, don’t embark on that strategy.


9. Unless you are absolutely committed to being a market timer, use both timing and buy-and-hold.

This gives you two non-correlated approaches that will have differing results in any given period. Over long periods, carefully chosen investments in similar assets may generate similar returns with buy-and-hold and market timing. But in the meantime, the average of the two may give you lower losses, less risk and (perhaps most important) less anxiety than either market timing or buy-and-hold alone. This combination may be more appealing to many people than the peaks and valleys of each approach separately.

10. Make sure you understand in advance the realities of market timing.
And make sure you are prepared for them. I cannot emphasize this point too much, so I hope you’ll read the following overview. If you invest money that’s governed by timing and you’re surprised by everything that happens to your investment, you will always feel off balance. You’ll come to dislike and distrust timing. And even if you follow your system, timing will produce anxiety for you. That is just the opposite of what it’s intended to do.

Measuring the Timing Ability and Performance of Bond Mutual Funds

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Via CXOAG Investing Notes:

Do managers of bond mutual funds generate value for fund holders by successfully timing the market? In the September 2009 update of their paper entitled “Measuring the Timing Ability and Performance of Bond Mutual Funds”, Yong Chen, Wayne Ferson and Helen Peters evaluate the ability of U.S. bond fund managers to time nine common factors related to bond returns. The nine factors reflect the term structure of interest rates, credit and liquidity spreads, currency exchange rates, mortgage spread and equity market returns. The authors also define seven benchmarks matching different bond fund styles. Using monthly returns for more than 1,400 U.S. bond mutual funds and contemporaneous bond market factor and benchmark data during January 1962 through March 2007, they conclude that:

  • Across all bond mutual funds over the entire sample period, the mean monthly return is 0.62% and the standard deviation of monthly returns is 1.51%.
  • After controlling for return series non-linearities unrelated to timing, the evidence for market timing ability is on average neutral to weak.
  • With these controls, 75% of bond funds significantly outperform style-matched benchmarks before fund costs (average expense ratio of each fund plus an assumed round trip trading cost associated with the fund style), but there is no evidence of net outperformance on average after costs.

In summary, evidence provides weak support for a belief that managers of U.S. bond mutual funds can on average time the bond market, but fund costs/fees offset any associated net outperformance of reasonable benchmarks.

The Rumours of the Dollar’s Death Are Much Exaggerated


Via Martin Wolf in FT.com:

The dollar’s correction is not just natural; it is helpful. It will lower the risk of deflation in the US and facilitate the correction of the global “imbalances” that helped cause the crisis. I agree with a forthcoming article by Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics that “huge inflows of foreign capital to the US facilitated the over-leveraging and underpricing of risk”.* Even those who are sceptical of this agree that the US needs export-led growth.

Finally, what can replace the dollar? Unless and until China removes exchange controls and develops deep and liquid financial markets – probably a generation away – the euro is the dollar’s only serious competitor. At present, 65 per cent of the world’s reserves are in dollars and 25 per cent in euros. Yes, there could be some shift. But it is likely to be slow. The eurozone also has high fiscal deficits and debts. The dollar will exist 30 years from now; the euro’s fate is less certain.

Read the full article here

Corporatist Pigs!


Via Mises.org:

Throngs of tweenies rushed to buy their copies of the June 2009 issue of Rolling Stone, eager to read about the adorable Jonas Brothers. As they flipped it open, questions rushed through their heads: “Are they on tour?” “Do they have girlfriends?” “What do they look for in a girl?”

What those girls weren’t asking themselves was “How was Goldman Sachs, the world’s most profitable investment bank, involved in creating the current financial crisis?” But that didn’t stop Matt Taibbi from answering that question in the same issue of Rolling Stone, in his article, “The Great American Bubble Machine.”

Interestingly, in a November 9, 2007, interview with Marty Beckerman of Reason, Taibbi actually described himself as “more of a libertarian than anything else.” Unfortunately, in keeping with Rolling Stone‘s dominant line, Taibbi’s attack on Goldman Sachs was quite antimarket. He coolly placed the blame for the US financial crisis on the shoulders of this lone company.

However, he did manage to illuminate the bank’s relationship with government regulators and the Federal Reserve. As the saying goes, “even a broken clock is right twice a day.”

…Taibbi first characterizes the corruption at Goldman Sachs as an inevitable result of “free markets and free elections,” then argues that it was made possible by “the aid of a crippled and corrupt state.” So, which is it? The free markets or the state-sanctioned corruption? These are entirely different arguments and they must be carefully treated as such.

I will be the first to argue against the state aiding and abetting corporations. Among the advocates of the laissez-faire system, there is a clear understanding that such aid is corporatism or corporate socialism.

Yet in all such schemes, the hand of government regulators is disguised so well that when the scheme fails, most people see the puppet but overlook the puppet master. Perhaps Taibbi can be forgiven for the error. After all, we have been witness to numerous such shell games at the hands of government.

Read the full article here

Why Markets Make Mistakes

Sunday, October 11, 2009

Via Simoleon Sense:

Introduction (Via SSRN):

The research described in this article calls into question the assumptions of rationality, transparency, efficiency, and homogeneity on which many models of markets are based (see for example Samuelson 1948; Bass 1969; Fisher and Pry 1971, Malkiel 1973). The classic models assume, at least implicitly, that decision makers understand the structure of the market and how it produces the dynamics which can be observed or might potentially occur. Are these models acceptable simplifications, or can they be seriously misleading?
This article explains why markets routinely and repeatedly make “mistakes” that are inconsistent with the simplifying assumptions and often produce disastrously wrong business decisions. The undesirable outcomes could include vicious cycles of investment and profitability, market bubbles, accelerated commoditization, excessive investment in dead-end technologies, giving up on a product that becomes a huge success, waiting too long to reinvent legacy companies, and changes in market leadership. The article illuminates the effects of bounded rationality, imperfect information, fragmentation of decision making, and extrapolating past trends.

Click Here To Learn Why Markets Make Mistakes

What We Talk About When We Talk About the Efficient Market Hypothesis


Via The Curious Capitalist:

Eugene Fama said that in order to test whether markets were efficient in this sense you needed an economic theory of how prices were determined. He chose the Capital Asset Pricing Model, devised a few years before by Jack Treynor, Bill Sharpe and John Lintner. It said risky stocks would outperform less-risky ones, with the risk that mattered being something called beta—the correlation of a stock’s movements to those of the overall market.

Roll started pointing out issues with CAPM in the 1970s, and Fama and French concluded in 1992 that the conjunction of CAPM and the EMH simply didn’t match the data. They chose to jettison CAPM, not the EMH (Fischer Black made more or less the opposite choice). But without an economic theory of how stock prices should move, there’s no way of testing the claim that markets are efficient in the “price is right” sense. Pricing models like the arbitrage pricing theory or the Fama-French factor models simply assume that prices are right, then extrapolate from that what the relevant risk factors must be that determine prices. But this assumption that prices are right is now based on no empirical evidence at all. In fact, both Fama and Roll have said that there’s just no way to tell whether prices are right or not.

That leaves us with an efficient market hypothesis that merely claims, as John Cochrane puts it, that “nobody can tell where markets are going.” This is an okay theory, and one that has held up reasonably well—although there are well-documented exceptions such as the value and momentum effects. But if “we can’t tell where the markets are going” was all the finance professors had to offer, they wouldn’t have had much influence.

The price-is-right combo of EMH and CAPM allowed finance professors to say much more than “we dunno.” They may not have known exactly where a stock’s price was headed, but thanks to CAPM they could confidently predict the bounds within which it would move. Thus armed they went on to conquer the world, eventually transforming MBA curricula, legal thinking, corporate governance, financial regulation and many aspects of investment practice. It’s admirable that finance scholars—especially Fama, since it was his theory in the first place—kept sniffing around and eventually concluded that the EMH/CAPM combo didn’t match the evidence. It’s not so great that some of them now pretend that the price-is-right version of the efficient market hypothesis never existed, and fail to fully confront what its demise means for a lot of the other things taught in finance and investment classes.

Read the full post here

A Fundamental Confusion About the Nature of Wealth


Via The Economist:

People nevertheless use the stockmarket as a barometer of economic health. So a rise in equity markets can be (and has been) seen by governments and central bankers as evidence that the economy is headed in the right direction. That can lead to policy mistakes, such as a lax monetary stance, and further irrational exuberance.

Housing is more complicated than the stockmarket since people get utility from their homes (shelter, relaxation) while simultaneously treating them as assets. Even so, a rise in house prices that outpaces GDP growth does not make a society richer. Instead, all that is achieved is a transfer of wealth from first-time buyers to retirees exiting the property market.

In theory house prices can rise faster than GDP for a while if citizens decide to devote more of their incomes to housing services (for example, they may prefer a bigger flat to a bigger car). In practice it is hard to disentangle such structural shifts from the speculation that is prominent in all property booms.

It is the link between speculation and asset prices that explains this crisis. The ability to borrow money to buy assets fuelled the rise in asset prices. And the wealth effect of higher prices persuaded those in English-speaking countries to borrow money to sustain consumption.

Not long ago the BBC transmitted a programme about credit-card use. One man said he felt “wealthier” because he was given a credit-card limit of £5,000 ($8,000). Of course, once he used the card he was poorer. Not only did he have to repay the £5,000, but he had to service a double-digit interest rate as well. Similarly those who buy an overvalued asset with borrowed money have not made themselves richer but poorer.

Read the full article here

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